Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

The State of Utah v. Kenneth Nolan Shrewsbury :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; attorney general; Kenneth A. Bronston; assistant attorney general; attorneys for
appellee.
Joan C. Watt; Robert L. Steele; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; counsel for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Shrewsbury, No. 950312 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6650

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF

&#ftSP« *PT OF APPEALS

UTAH
HE STATE OF UTAH,

K - n

Plaintiff/Appellee,

u

• > 3

/.

Case No. 950312-CA
Priority No. 2

KENNETH NOLAN SHREWSBURY,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Failure to
Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1953 as amended);
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
Distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (1953 as amended); and False Identity to a
Peace Officer, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-507 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding.
JOAN C. WATT, #3967
ROBERT L. STEELE, #5546
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Standby Counsel for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
KENNETH A. BRONSTON
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

FILED
FEB 1 6 1996
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
E STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

ENNETH NOLAN SHREWSBURY,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 950312-CA
Priority No. 2

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Failure to
Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1953 as amended);
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
Distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (1953 as amended); and False Identity to a
Peace Officer, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-507 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding.
JOAN C. WATT, #3967
ROBERT L. STEELE, #5546
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Standby Counsel for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
KENNETH A. BRONSTON
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABLE OF AUTHORITIES
NTRODUCTION
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ASK
APPROPRIATE VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS REQUIRES A
NEW TRIAL IN THIS CASE WHERE THE TRIAL COURT
DID NOT ASK OTHER QUESTIONS AIMED AT
ELICITING THE SAME INFORMATION AND THE
FAILURE TO ASK THE QUESTIONS SUBSTANTIALLY
IMPAIRED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO AN INFORMED
EXERCISE OF HIS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. . .

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
arrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96 (Utah App.
1993)
iprnsby v. Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop, 758 P.2d 929 (Utah App. 1988)
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988)

ii

1, 3, 4,
5
1, 3
3

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
HE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

r_

j

CENNETH NOLAN SHREWSBURY,

:

De f endant/Appe11ant.

Case No. 950312-CA
Priority No. 2

:

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Kenneth Shrewsbury replies to the
State's brief as follows.

Issues which are not analyzed in this

reply brief were adequately addressed in Appellant's opening
brief or do not otherwise require a reply.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A traditional harmless error review does not apply to a
trial court's erroneous refusal to ask an appropriate voir dire
question.

The correct standard for reversibility where a trial

judge refused to ask an appropriate voir dire question is whether
"the appellant's right to the informed exercise of peremptory
challenges has been 'substantially impaired.'"

Barrett v.

Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 103 (Utah App. 1993), citing Hornsbv v.
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah App.
1988) .
In making that determination, this Court considers
whether under "the totality of questioning, counsel [is not]
afforded an adequate opportunity to evaluate the jurors."
Barrett, 868 P.2d at 102-103 (citations omitted).

The questions requested in this case were appropriate
since they were designed to elicit information about the jurors'
biases regarding the use of marijuana or free agency beliefs.
Shrewsbury would have been able to intelligently exercise his
peremptory challenges had he known whether any of the jurors were
strongly opposed to the use of marijuana or had strong feelings
about free agency beliefs.

The concern with such information is

that jurors holding such beliefs may be less likely to
impartially weigh the evidence; as a defendant who was allowed to
present these defenses, Shrewsbury had an interest in knowing
whether potential jurors strongly opposed such beliefs.
The broad questions asked by the judge were not aimed at
eliciting this information.

Therefore, Shrewsbury's right to

intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges was
substantially impaired by the trial judge's refusal to ask
questions aimed at eliciting this information.

ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ASK
APPROPRIATE VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS REQUIRES A NEW
TRIAL IN THIS CASE WHERE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ASK OTHER QUESTIONS AIMED AT ELICITING THE SAME
INFORMATION AND THE FAILURE TO ASK THE QUESTIONS
SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO AN
INFORMED EXERCISE OF HIS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES.
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief)
In footnote 6 on page 16 of its brief, the State claims:
Even if it was error to refuse defendant's
requested questions, the error was at most
harmless. "An error is harmful if the likelihood
of a different result is 'sufficiently high to
2

undermine confidence in the verdict. ' "
omitted].

[citation

:ate's brief at 16. The State's standard for reversibility is
ncorrect pursuant to Barrett, Hornsby and cases cited therein.
In Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, this Court
eiterated the standard for reversibility where a trial judge
*efused to ask an appropriate voir dire question.
However, " [s]ubstantial impairment of the right
to informed exercise of peremptory challenges is
reversible error." Hornsby v. Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah App.
1988). Accordingly, we must reverse if
"'considering the totality of the questioning,
counsel [is not] afforded an adequate opportunity
to gain the information necessary to evaluate the
jurors.'" Id. at 932 (quoting State v. Bishop,
753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988)).
Barrett, 868 P.2d at 103.
This Court expressly rejected the appellee's claim in
Barrett that "a trial court's voir dire ruling and subsequent
entry of judgment may be reversed only if appellant demonstrates
that the absence of error committed below would have resulted in
a different outcome."

Barrett, 868 P.2d at 103.

Indeed, the

Barrett court pointed out that "such a standard is impossible to
apply in the context of voir dire questioning."

Id.

An appellant claiming that the trial court's
unreasonable limitation of voir dire
substantially impaired his ability to exercise
peremptory challenges simply cannot prove, in the
traditional way, that prejudice resulted from the
error. Appellant cannot show with any certainty
that had certain questions been asked, particular
responses would have been received; that certain
jurors would then have been challenged for cause
or peremptorily; and that particular, more
favorably predisposed jurors would have been
seated instead, who would have deliberated to a
3

different result. Accordingly, in this context,
we apply the test enunciated in Hornsby:
Prejudicial error is shown if the appellant's
right to the informed exercise of peremptory
challenges has been "substantially impaired."
758 P.2d at 933.
Barrett, 868 P.2d at 103. Hence, in Barrett. this Court
expressly rejected the standard for reversibility which is
articulated by the State in footnote 6 of its brief.
The correct inquiry in determining whether to reverse a
conviction based on the trial court's refusal to ask an
appropriate voir dire question is a determination of whether
"considering the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not]
afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information
necessary to evaluate the jurors."

Id.

This Court held in

Barrett that reversible error occurred where the trial judge did
not ask preliminary tort reform questions because counsel was not
given an adequate opportunity to evaluate the jurors for use of
peremptory challenges based on the totality of the questioning.
In the present case, the requested questions about
marijuana use and flight were proper because they were designed
to elicit responses which would inform Appellant of any strong
beliefs held by potential jurors regarding the \ase of marijuana
or free agency concepts.

This would have aided Appellant in

intelligently exercising his peremptory challenges.
The State claims that the questions which were asked
"provided defendant with adequate information to evaluate juror
bias and to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges."
State's brief at 13. The State then relies on general questions
4

Ltnilar to those relied on by the appellee in Barrett.
In Barrett, this Court rejected the claim that the
otality of questioning adequately addressed appellant's
oncerns, pointing out that the trial court
asked only broad questions concerning the
prospective jurors' ability to be fair and
impartial. As a result of this limited line of
questioning, appellant was wholly unable to
determine which, if any, prospective jurors had
been exposed to tort reform propaganda, much less
whether that exposure produced hidden or
subconscious biases affecting their ability to
render a fair and impartial verdict.
Barrett, 868 P.2d at 103.
The general questions relied on by the State in the
present case are also broad questions aimed only at determining
whether jurors can be fair and impartial and not at the specific
information sought by Appellant.

Indeed, the State claims that

Shrewsbury's requested questions about marijuana and free agency
were unnecessary because:
The court asked the venire whether: (1) they
could not listen fairly and weigh impartially the
evidence in reaching a verdict; (2) they or their
immediate family members had been charged or
convicted of a felony; (3) they or their family
members had ever been the subject of an
automobile stop by a police officer resulting in
an altercation, verbal or with fists, whether or
not arrested or taken into custody; and (4) they
had ever been charged or convicted of possession
or distribution of illegal drugs.
State's brief at 14-15.
None of these questions went to the heart of Appellant's
concerns regarding the jurors' attitudes toward marijuana use or
free agency beliefs. A juror could have held strong views on
5

these subjects which coincided or clashed with the views held by
Shrewsbury and not have been charged with a drug related crime or
gotten into an altercation with officers.

These broad questions

failed to address the concerns raised in Shrewsbury's questions.
The questions requested by Appellant were appropriate
because they would have allowed Shrewsbury to learn whether any
of the jurors held biases about marijuana use and free agency
beliefs which might interfere with his or her ability to
impartially listen to the evidence.

Although the State claims

these questions were directed at nullification and therefore not
appropriate (State's brief at 9-11), the questions actually would
have allowed Shrewsbury to determine whether any of these jurors
were opposed to marijuana use or free agency ideas, thereby
aiding Shrewsbury in the exercise of his peremptory challenges
and possibly unearthing a challenge for cause.

To the extent

that these questions also uncovered information that a juror
believed in jury nullification or favored the use of marijuana,
the prosecutor would have been free to peremptorily challenge
those jurors or to attempt a challenge for cause.

The attitudes

of the jurors towards marijuana use and free agency beliefs were
important areas of information.

Questioning jurors about those

attitudes would have aided Shrewsbury in the intelligent exercise
of his peremptory challenges.
In this case where the requested questions were
appropriate, no other questions elicited the information sought,
and the failure to ask the questions substantially impaired
6

irewsbury's exercise of his peremptory challenges, a new trial
3 required.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
is convictions and remand the case for a new trial.

SUBMITTED this

Hit

day of February, 1996.

C^c-o)^>
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

ROBERT L. STEELE
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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